Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail by Bryan Early

Author:Bryan Early [Early, Bryan]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9780804794329
Google: purrBQAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 35191884
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Published: 2015-02-11T00:00:00+00:00

6

Assessing Which Third-Party States Become Trade-Based Sanctions Busters

THIS CHAPTER EVALUATES THE GENERALIZABILITY OF THE sanctions-busting theory’s explanation of trade-based sanctions busting using a statistical method of analysis. It analyzes the sanctions-busting trade relationships that third-party states had with target states over the course of the same set of ninety-six U.S. sanctions episodes examined in Chapter 3. The analysis tests the key factors that contribute to whether a third-party state will engage in trade-based sanctions busting on behalf of a target state in a given year. It complements the findings from the previous statistical analysis by identifying the reasons why specific third-party states sanctions-busted on the target states’ behalves in each of those sanctions episodes. The results of this analysis offer generalizable insights into the factors that influence trade-based sanctions-busting behavior and can be used to develop a profile of the states most likely to become trade-based sanctions busters in any given sanctions episode.

The results are highly supportive of the trade-based sanctions-busting hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4. The factors that affect the profitability of trade between third-party and target states appear to have the greatest influence over which third-party states become extensive sanctions busters. Along those lines, the results strongly support the hypothesis that U.S. allies should be more likely to bust its sanctions than nonallied states. The results also provide further evidence to suggest that the neighbors of target states conduct a significant proportion of their sanctions-busting trade via illicit or unrecorded channels. The sanctions-busting profile that can be gleaned from this analysis paints a disturbing picture for American policy makers: U.S. sanctions are most likely to be undercut by fellow democracies with which it is allied that also possess large, globalized economies (for example, France, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, and so on). In other words, the closest friends of the United States turn out to be its sanctions’ greatest enemies.

Analyzing Trade-Based Sanctions Busters

This chapter employs a data set of the yearly trade relationships that 165 different third-party states had with countries sanctioned by the United States from 1950 through 2002. The dependent variable of this analysis is whether third-party states engage in trade-based sanctions busting on a target’s behalf in a given year. Drawing on the factors identified by the hypotheses, a binary time-series cross-sectional analysis is used to identify the variables that are most strongly associated with trade-based sanctions-busting behavior.

The data set is constructed to facilitate analyzing how both sender and target states can influence whether third-party states sanctions-bust on the target’s behalf. The structure of the data set is organized around the specific triadic relationships formed among the primary sender (in this case, the United States), the target of its sanctions, and the various third-party states. To create the data set, the observation years in which the United States had imposed sanctions against a target are identified for each of the sanctions episodes. For each U.S.–target pairing in these sanctions episodes, the remaining states in the world are matched with them as third-party states to form individual triadic units.

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